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ABSTRACT
Title of Dissertation:

Identification and challenge of human factors under
the trend of MASS development

Degree:

Master of Science

With the development of technology, MASS has gradually been widely used, and the
crew has changed from the previous operator to the monitor. However, many
accidents caused by human factors occurred during this process. At present, most
scholars explore the human factors of MASS from one or several aspects, and they are
independent of each other. The degree of influence of the main factors cannot be
distinguished effectively, so it is necessary to explore the human factors in MASS.
This paper first introduces the types and main technologies of MASS, and then takes
ship company A as the research object. Questionnaire survey is used to collect the
relevant information of the crew and determine the main set of human factors
considered by the crew in company A. Through the investigation, the main human
factors in MASS are responsibility awareness, information overload, dependence on
automation, loss of situational awareness, fatigue and boredom from normal work,
mistakes in Programming, communication between shore-based operators and other
relevant organizations and security on the Network. Then identify the analyzed factors
and discuss the rationality of why choose these human factors. Then, through
literature review method to investigate the human factors in different fields of
automation equipment, compare the human factors in MASS. It is proved that these
human factors may also occur on MASS. Finally, the author puts forward reasonable
control and solutions to help MASS prevent risks in advance or reduce risks caused
by human factors.
KEYWORDS: MASS; SCC; Human factor; SHELL model; Scenario identification

TABLE OF CONTENTS
DECLARATION............................................................................................................................. Ⅰ
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT...............................................................................................................Ⅱ
ABSTRACT.................................................................................................................................... Ⅲ
TABLE OF CONTENTS................................................................................................................ Ⅳ
LIST OF TABLES...........................................................................................................................Ⅵ
LIST OF FIGURES.........................................................................................................................Ⅶ
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS..........................................................................................................Ⅷ
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................... 1
1.1 Research background.......................................................................................................... 1
1.2 Research status.................................................................................................................... 2
1.2.1 Development of MASS Abroad............................................................................... 2
1.2.2 Research Progress on Human Factors of MASS Abroad........................................ 3
1.2.2.1 An Overall Research of Human Factors in Automation............................... 3
1.2.2.2 Unilateral Research on Human Factors in MASS........................................ 3
1.3 Purpose and Significance of Research................................................................................ 5
CHAPTER 2 RELATED CONCEPTS OF MASS........................................................................... 6
2.1 Classification of ships......................................................................................................... 6
2.2 Key Technologies of MASS................................................................................................8
2.2.1 Ship Intelligent Sensing Technology....................................................................... 8
2.2.2 Intelligent decision-making technology for ships....................................................8
2.2.3 Ship Intelligent Execution Technology....................................................................9
2.2.4 Ship-shore Cooperation Support Technology........................................................10
CHAPTER 3 HUMAN FACTOR IDENTIFICATION OF UNMANNED VESSEL....................10
3.1 Selection of influencing factors identification method for unmanned craft.....................10
3.2 Selection and introduction of research objects................................................................. 10
3.2.1 Research object selection conditions..................................................................... 11
3.2.2 Research object.......................................................................................................11
3.3 Determination of main factors...........................................................................................11
3.3.1 Identification of factors.......................................................................................... 11
3.3.2 Questionnaire......................................................................................................... 12
3.4 Main human factors identification of mass.......................................................................16
3.4.1 Responsibility awareness....................................................................................... 16
3.4.2 Information overload..............................................................................................17
3.4.3 Dependence on automation.................................................................................... 18
3.4.4 Loss of situational awareness.................................................................................18
3.4.5 Fatigue and boredom from normal work............................................................... 20
3.4.6 Mistakes in programming...................................................................................... 20
3.4.7 Communication between shore-based operators and relevant organizations........21
3.4.8 Security on the Network.........................................................................................21
CHAPTER 4 HUMAN FACTORS OF AUTOMATION IN RELATED FIELDS........................22
4.1 Unmanned aerial vehicle...................................................................................................22

4.1.1 Teamwork in UAV..................................................................................................23
4.1.2 Reasonable Distribution of Human and Machine Functions.................................25
4.1.3 The health of the crew will be improved............................................................... 25
4.1.4 Lack of design standards........................................................................................26
4.1.5 Limitations to See & Avoid Capability.................................................................. 27
4.1.6 Loss of situational awareness.................................................................................27
4.1.7 Over dependence.................................................................................................... 28
4.1.8 Communication with various parties..................................................................... 29
4.2 Unmanned crane................................................................................................................29
4.2.1 Too much load on operators due to diverse work.................................................. 30
4.2.2 Lack of perspective................................................................................................ 30
4.3 Self-driving cars................................................................................................................ 31
4.3.1 Adaptive automation.............................................................................................. 31
4.3.2 Anxiety................................................................................................................... 32
4.3.3 Behavioral adaptation.............................................................................................33
4.3.4 Learn more relevant knowledge.............................................................................34
4.4 Unmanned subway............................................................................................................ 34
4.4.1 Recognition of obstacles........................................................................................ 34
4.4.2 Parking clearance................................................................................................... 35
4.5 Militarization automation..................................................................................................36
4.5.1 Fatigue and boredom of remote operation............................................................. 36
4.5.2 Distinguish friends and foes...................................................................................37
CHAPTER 5 RISK COUNTERMEASURES OF HUMAN FACTORS IN MASS......................37
5.1 Improve the operator's ability............................................................................................37
5.1.1 Enhance operator's understanding of automation system......................................38
5.1.2 Maintain situational awareness.............................................................................. 39
5.1.3 Appropriate attitude towards automation system...................................................40
5.2 Strengthen the cooperation between operators and other personnel................................ 41
5.2.1 Strengthen cooperation among SCC personnel..................................................... 41
5.2.2 Improve communication between operators and SCC managers..........................41
5.3 Improve procedures...........................................................................................................42
5.3.1 Improve training content........................................................................................ 42
5.3.2 Establish reasonable standard operation procedures............................................. 43
5.4 Improve the design of automation system........................................................................ 43
5.4.1 Follow the design principle of "human centered"................................................. 43
5.4.2 Improve navigation interface design......................................................................43
5.4.3 Introduce more advanced position and navigation system.................................... 44
5.4.4 Increase system information feedback...................................................................44
5.4.5 Consider individual operator habits....................................................................... 44
5.4.6 Enhance the design of non-automatic system........................................................45
5.4.7 Enhance network protection system...................................................................... 45
5.5 Strengthen company management.................................................................................... 45
5.5.1 Strengthen company organization..........................................................................45
5.5.2 Establish a good safety culture...............................................................................46

CONCLUSION............................................................................................................................... 47
REFERENCE.................................................................................................................................. 49
QUESTIONNAIRE......................................................................................................................... 52

LIST OF TABLES
TABLE 1-UNILATERAL RESEARCH OF HUMAN FACTORS BY DIFFERENT FOREIGN
SCHOLARS...................................................................................................................................... 3
TABLE 2-ALL HUMAN FACTORS CONSIDERED BY THE AUTHOR..................................11
TABLE 3-RESULTS OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE.......................................................................12
TABLE 4-OBSERVE THE IMPORTANCE OF DIFFERENT FACTORS THROUGH TOTAL
SCORES.......................................................................................................................................... 14
TABLE 5-GLOBAL HAWK AND PREDICTOR CRASH RATE IN 2012..................................23

LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE 1-TREATMENT OF THREE KINDS OF SHIPS IN COLLISION................................. 7
FIGURE 2-SHELL MODEL...........................................................................................................11
FIGURE 3-THE OPERATOR’S WORK STATION AND ONE DASHBOARD TO DISPLAY 9
GROUP INFORMATION FROM ONE UNMANNED SHIP.......................................................18
FIGURE 4-(A) TETRAHEDRAL MODEL ADAPTED FROM HARMONY; (B) FOUR
DISCREPANCIES ARE IDENTIFIED FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS.........................................19

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
SCC
MASS
IMO
MUNIN
COLREGS
UAV
FOV
GCS
SOP

Ship Control Center
Maritime Autonomous Surface Ship
International Maritime Organization
Maritime Unmanned Navigation through Intelligence in Networks
Convention on the International Regulations for
Preventing Collisions at Sea
Unmanned aerial vehicle
Field of View
Ground Control Station
Standard operation procedures

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Research background
In recent years, drones and autonomous vehicles have become increasingly popular
and have been used in daily life, military activities and scientific exploration.
However, applications related to unmanned vessels have only been proposed in recent
years, as they have not yet matured to the extent that they can be applied in daily life
on a large scale. The benefits of Maritime Autonomous Surface ships (MASS) to the
shipping industry are undeniable. On one hand, MASS reduce human input. The
navigation and maneuvering of MASS are mainly accomplished through autonomous
decision making, or remotely controlled by a few shore-based personnel. Unmanned
vessels reduce the need for full-time crew members on maritime patrol vessels,
reducing manpower costs. On the other hand, the use efficiency is improved. MASS
do not need crew space and equipment, thus reducing the power demand of crew,
greatly improving the space and energy efficiency of ships, and providing feasibility
for modular application of MASS. Moreover, the MASS has strong adaptability to the
environment and can perform tasks such as cruise and search and rescue in severe sea
conditions, especially at night. The time investment and risk investment of the crew
are reduced, and the use efficiency of the watercraft is improved. Human factors
usually refer to any factors related to people. An international definition of it is put
forward by Professor Edwards, that is, "human factor is to optimize the relationship
between human and its activities in the framework of system engineering through the
application of human science in systems" (Qiu, 2003) . But human factors bring us
opportunities as well as challenges, and the most heatedly debated topic is the safety
features of MASS. In proposing the Smart Ship project, Maritime Unmanned
Navigation through Intelligence in Networks (MUNIN) has ensured that MASS will
be at least as safe as conventional transport vessels. Perhaps some experts in the
maritime sector would argue that the advent of MASS would dramatically improve

safety, as they are unmanned. Could not it take the human element out of the
navigation process? It should be understood that 80% of maritime accidents are
related to human factors. But the fact is that MASS do not mean that they can solve
all the problems caused by human errors. On the contrary, unmanned vessels bring
more human factors problems. Even though the MASS will not be disturbed by the
operator, the operator is still part of the autonomous system. When some intelligent
systems cannot solve the problem, they still need operators to take over MASS.
Although the safety of MASS is the focus of many documents nowadays, human
factors which should be considered are still insufficient. (M.A. Ramos&J.E. Vinnem,
2018) This article introduces the human factors challenges faced by MASS, and then
compares them with those of intelligent facilities in other fields, so as to give
reasonable suggestions to MASS to improve safety.
1.2 Research status
1.2.1 Development of MASS Abroad
After nine IMO member countries, such as the United States, Norway and Denmark,
submitted proposals to the Maritime Safety Committee to define the scope of
legislation in the MASS field, the International Maritime Organization put the issue of
self-driving ships on the agenda of the 98th session of the Maritime Safety Committee
held in June 2017. The meeting called on the shipping industry and relevant scientific
research institutions to put into the research of MASS as soon as possible and develop
intelligent or automatic ships of different levels. Firstly, semi-automated or even
fully-automated operation of short-distance dry cargo transport and small special
operation vessels operating in port areas, and then automation of long-distance cargo
transport will be considered. After that, in order to strive for a better working
environment, reduce transportation costs, reduce global demand for emissions, and
improve shipping safety. EU implements feasibility of MASS and definition of
shore-based center in the Seventh Framework MUNIN. MUNIN believes that a crew
member on an unmanned vessel is sufficient to help the ship call port, but a monitor is

needed at the shore-based center to switch from automatic to manual navigation if
necessary. At the same time, AAWA has different views on the automation level of
MASS. AAWA believes that MASS should be fully automatic, should not have crew
on board, and can dynamically adjust their own state. This means that the MASS will
change its automatic level according to the different tasks it performs.
1.2.2 Research Progress on Human Factors of MASS Abroad
Research on human factors of MASS system can be divided into two aspects. One is
the overall research on the influence of automation on human behavior, and the other
is targeted unilateral research on influencing factors.
1.2.2.1 An Overall Study of Human Factors in Automation
MASS have been the topic of discussion in recent years, and human factors in
automation systems have been concerned and studied for many years, so many
scholars in this field have chosen to directly study the unilateral human factors that
affect MASS. In 1999, Funk made a preliminary discussion on the human factors in
the automation environment and summarized 102 related issues. By means of
questionnaire and statistical analysis, 10 questions with the largest proportion are
concluded (Shappell S et al., 2007) . After Funk's research, the overall identification
research on the identification of influencing factors of automation system on human
has gradually decreased. however, with the introduction of new types of automation
systems, the discussion on human and automation issues has attracted the attention of
scholars. In 2009, NaidooP conducted a research on the perception of pilots in modern
advanced automated cockpit. Through the questionnaire method, it was concluded
that the driver's understanding, training and trust degree of automation were the main
factors affecting the perception of pilots in cockpit. In 2013, K.B. Sullivan and others
used BP neural network method to identify hazard sources for the interaction between
human and automation system, and found that cross-checking errors, task allocation
and situational awareness are unstable factors affecting human in automation.
1.2.2.2 Unilateral Study on Human Factors in MASS

Table 1-Unilateral research of human factors by different foreign scholars

Yemao Man

Research direction and achievements

Deficiencies in Research

He made use of the differences in

The prediction of the

tetrahedral harmony model to reveal the

operator's ability has

changes in situational awareness

become a research

requirements during the transfer from

challenge, especially the

ship to shore. It was found that the

level of the captain and

separation of the operator and the ship

senior crew. The

greatly affected the generation of

tetrahedronal model can

situational awareness (Yemao Man et

not control the change of

al ., 2015) .

personal ability demand.

Monica Lundh and others put forward
the idea of designing a comprehensive
system by screening key investigation
objects and investigating the key
Yemao Man,

aspects of human factors that maintain

Monica

the sense of ship. Through the analysis

Lundh

of the characteristics of the shipboard

Maintenance of MASS has
become a new problem

and shore-based environment, the
inherent variability of human factors in
these applications is revealed (Yemao
Man et al., 2014) .
M.A. Ramos identified and modeled

M.A. Ramos

the interaction between the operator

There is no discussion on

and the MASS, and determined the

how to reduce accidents

possible human factor accidents caused

caused by human factors

by these interactions (M.A. Ramos et

al., 2018) .
Retowber uses remote monitoring
system to simulate automated merchant
ships, studies the influence of human
factors and interface design, and finds
that even a nearly perfect unrealistic
system will have human factors. And it
provided an ecological approach to the
Reto Weber

design of the system, since he
considered the coupling between the
pilot and the environment to be an

In the future, they will
consider the ecological
problems and language
environment problems

ecological issue, in order to be able to
create a technical tool that could truly
support the pilot in dealing with the
complexities of the unmanned ship
domain (Yemao Man et al., 2018) .
Krzysztof Wrobel listed the risk
influencing factors that affect the safety
of MASS. The 4P4F framework is

Krzysztof
Wrobel

introduced, which consists of four

Some factors outside the

operation stages (voyage planning,

4P4F framework may be

berthing or disengaging, port

ignored, such as

approaching or departing, open sea

inappropriate

passage) and four different factors

organizational structure

(human factor, ship factor, environment

level, shift handover, and

factor, technology factor). Based on

inappropriate SCC design

this framework, it is analyzed that the
high seas are the places where risk
influencing factors occur most, and

most risk influencing factors are related
to human factors. The research results
help designers and operators to
overcome or reduce these shortcomings
of risk influencing factors, thus
promoting the safe operation of MASS
(Fan et al., 2020) .
Source: Author
1.3 Purpose and Significance of Research
Safety is an issue that cannot be ignored at every stage of the development of
intelligent ships, and the safety requirements for MASS should at least be the same as
the safety of the current manned ships. Utne (2017) proposed risk influencing factors
to analyze autonomous ship collision hazards from three perspectives: mission,
environment, and system. Krzysztof Wróbel analyzed the safety control structure of
the autonomous ship itself, and the list of hazards and mitigation measures from the
structure (Yemao, 2014) . M Lutzhoft (2019) analyzed how human beings cooperate
or hand over with automatic ships by holding expert seminars, and mapped and
investigated the potential gap between current seamen's skill training and future
autonomous navigation. Hogg and Ghosh (2016) studied the effective factors
influencing the commissioning of automated merchant ships from the legal, safety,
seafarer and automated machine coordination and social perspectives. Montewka,
Jakub developed a precautionary approach to the failure of human factors at MASS.
However, only a few papers have discussed the potential impact of human factors on
MASS (Montewka&Jakub, 2019) .
Nowadays, due to the rapid development of MASS, most countries have focused on
the development of science and technology. Almost no attention has been paid to how
shore-based operators are educated and trained, and the traditional crew cannot be
arranged directly to the shore base. On the one hand, on-shore working is a different

environment; on the other hand, crews may transfer the human factors on board the
ship directly to the SCC. It must be understood that when completely MASS are used,
the human factor still exists. The shore-based control of ships includes new safety
problems. The interaction between manned and unmanned ships in the same traffic
area will become a mixed traffic situation. If these problems are not found and solved
in time, it will bring more troubles. This paper focuses on the influence of human
factors on MASS by comparing the influence of human factors in other automation
fields. Will the human factors of MASS different from traditional ships? What
challenges will it bring to MASS at this stage? How to correct the details ignored by
the personnel of the ship control center or the crew of the semi-automatic ship, so as
to better reduce the navigation risks of MASS and protect the safety of the sea and life
and property?

CHAPTER 2 RELATED CONCEPTS OF MASS

2.1 Classification of ships
Generally speaking, there are three types of ships as shown in Figure 1.
The first is automated ships. Most traditional ships have different degrees of
intelligence and have achieved partial automation, mainly reflected in the following
three aspects. First, the crew can control the ship remotely. Second, in the event of a
malfunction while the ship is underway, the system can automatically alarm and input
relevant information into the computer, so that the crew can effectively correct it, and
even realize automatic repair and adjustment of some faults. Third, the navigation
system can automatically control the ship's navigation according to the ship's
pre-determined operating route, but this kind of navigation has some risks. Crews
must supervise when encountering complex routes. In the event of a collision hazard,
the crew is required to give detection and command from a remote location.
The second is the intelligent ships. Intelligentization refers to a mode in which

modern communication technology, intelligent control technology and computer
network technology are jointly applied to the ship. It has the functions of evaluation,
diagnosis, prediction and decision-making. This vessel can use technologies such as
radar, AIS and electronic nautical charts to accurately identify obstacles in transit and
provide timely warning so that the vessel can be controlled to avoid the detected
obstacles successfully. In recent years, intelligent ships have been a mainstream
research direction in many countries, and such developments will reduce the number
of crew and shipping costs. The intelligence of the ship needs to evolve gradually,
starting with remote monitoring and troubleshooting of faults, followed by
optimization and decision support. The link with shore-based center gives effective
decision-making on ship operations. Then remote or semi-autonomous operation is
achieved.
The third type is unmanned ships. It is an almost completely unmanned ship, where
the ship requires only a small number of people to direct assistance while berthing and
loading and unloading cargo. Sometimes no human involvement is even required.
And when the ship encounters problems that it cannot handle on its own, the
shore-based operator steps in and exercises remote control until problem solving
(Marilia Abilio Ramos et al., 2019) . This is the highest level of intelligent ship
development. It is equivalent to an intelligent robot, which can realize external
perception and make corresponding decisions.

Figure 1-Treatment of three kinds of ships in collision

Source: Author
The three types of autonomous vessels described above must be progressively more
intelligent and cannot be promoted directly from manned to unmanned vessels, and no
country is likely to make such a risky attempt (Laurinen, 2016; Utne et al., 2017) . At
the same time, most people remain skeptical about the safety of intelligent ships,
suggesting that unmanned ships should be restricted in some way and should be
supervised or controlled by a ship command center at all times.
2.2 Key Technologies of MASS
MASS refers to a ship that uses sensors, communication, Internet of Things, Internet
and other technical means to automatically sense and obtain information and data of
the ship itself, shipping environment, logistics, ports and other aspects. Moreover, it
can be based on artificial intelligence technology, computer technology, automatic
control technology and big data processing and analysis technology to realize
intelligent

operation

in

ship

navigation,

management,

maintenance,

cargo

transportation and other aspects. MASS will be safer, more environmentally friendly,
more economical and more reliable. MASS mainly include four key technologies as
listed below:
2.2.1 Ship Intelligent Sensing Technology
Ship Intelligent Sensing Technology includes the intelligent perception of ship
external information and ship internal information. Among them, the external
information mainly includes the basic parameters of wind, waves and currents in the
navigation areas, the situation of obstacles, other ships, etc. Internal information
mainly refers to the hull status, engine room status, cargo status, energy efficiency
status, as well as the parameters, vibration, noise, corrosion, fatigue, etc. of the ship's
equipment in the process of design, construction and navigation. The stable
acquisition of information reduces the human error caused by insufficient observation.
2.2.2 Intelligent decision-making technology for ships

Intelligent decision-making technology for ships can use computer technology and
control technology to analyze and process the acquired external information and
internal information, and make intelligent decisions to realize ship route optimization,
risk early warning, intelligent collision avoidance, energy efficiency management,
autonomous weather routing, intelligent processing of navigation information, etc.
This technology can help reduce human error. In normal navigation or in danger, the
system can provide some advice to the operator. Whether on board or SCC, operators
can avoid accidents caused by personal reckless operation and enhance the safety of
MASS.
2.2.3 Ship Intelligent Execution Technology
Various facilities, equipments and instruments on board the ship should fully
understand and execute the instructions issued in the intelligent decision-making
process, and can feed back the intelligent execution results to the intelligent
decision-making center.
2.2.4 Ship-shore Cooperation Support Technology
The MASS transmits all information and data in the process of intelligent perception,
intelligent decision-making and intelligent execution to the shore in real time through
the ship-shore cooperative support system, so that shore-based personnel can carry out
real-time online monitoring to understand the ship's navigation state and make
reasonable necessary responses. Although this technology can represent that mass has
reached a high level of intelligence. But at the same time, human factors are also
transferred from the ship to the control center.

CHAPTER 3 HUMAN FACTOR IDENTIFICATION OF UNMANNED

VESSEL

3.1 Selection of influencing factors identification method for unmanned craft

This paper takes the human factors of unmanned vessel as the research object, and
fully considers the feeling of the operators in the actual navigation in the research
process. The questionnaires given can comprehensively and objectively reflect the
influencing factors of unmanned vessel on the pilot's behavior.
3.2 Selection and introduction of research objects
3.2.1 Research object selection conditions
In this paper, we should consider the two aspects of human and automation when
selecting the research objects. First of all, on the human side: the research object
should have enough crew members. The average distribution of crew navigation
experience, and the proportion of new and old crew members should also be
appropriate. Secondly, ships: there should be a certain number of ships. Ship
manufacturers should be complete, and there should be a variety of ships equipped
with complete automation system equipment.
3.2.2 Research object
In this study, the branches of shipping company A are taken as the main research
objects. The shipping company currently has 110 crew members, mainly engaged in
passenger and cargo transportation.
3.3 Determination of main factors
3.3.1 Identification of factors
This chapter explores the identification of human factors in MASS. It is necessary to
identify all factors affecting operators in SCC. This identification must be
comprehensive and not be analyzed by a single accident. On the other hand, this paper
focuses on human beings. In order to make the analysis more comprehensive and
make the classification clear, the author intends to analyze the factors from four
aspects: human, hardware, environment and software. This is a reference to the
SHELL model proposed by Edward and modified by Hawkins. The four elements

constitute the interface system around the human factors in the middle. In this way,
the relationship between different factors can be identified more intuitively.

Figure 2-SHELL model
Source: Internet
The L in the center of the picture is the most important part. Human factors and other
factors influence each other. This paper will make a table according to the first level
factors and the second level factors. The first level factors are L-L, L-E, L-H and L-S.
the second level factors are the influencing factors extended from the first level
factors.
Table 2-All human factors considered by the author
The first factors

The second factors
Workload, Lack of basic skills, Level of trust in the system,

Only L

Recognition of automation system, Fatigue and boredom from
normal work, Sense of responsibility, Situational awareness,
Experience level, Tension level, Preparation before sailing

L-L

Coordination with successors, Crew cooperation, Communication
with trainers
Complexity of automation system, Reliability of automation

L-H

system, Mistakes in Programming, Number of monitors,
Instrument light, Security on the Network

L-E

Noise, Weather condition, Bridge space

L-S

Inadequate navigation supervision, Training of shipping company,
Navigation information

Source: Author
3.3.2 Questionnaire
In the shipping company A, 80 crew members were randomly selected for
questionnaire test. 78 questionnaires were collected, of which 75 were available, and
the effective rate of the questionnaire was 93.75%. The data collected are as follows:
Table 3-Results of the questionnaire

Workload
Communicatio
n with trainers

Very

unimporta

unimportan

nt（2

t（1 point）

points）

0

Very

intermediate

Important(

（3 points）

4 points)

0

37

31

6

0

0

41

18

5

0

0

20

40

20

0

0

44

19

1

0

27

42

5

0

0

17

42

15

0

0

0

7

45

23

important(
5 points)

Fatigue and
boredom from
normal work
Lack of basic
skills
Experience
level
Recognition of
automation
system
Situational

awareness
Level of trust
in the system
Tension level
Preparation
before sailing
Crew
cooperation

0

40

15

20

0

0

14

35

21

0

0

10

46

12

7

0

0

10

57

7

0

50

20

10

0

0

0

33

39

2

0

0

50

25

0

3

55

17

0

0

11

53

11

0

0

0

20

37

18

0

0

0

10

45

19

Coordination
with
successors
Security on the
Network
Inadequate
navigation
supervision
Training of
shipping
company
Navigation
information
Complexity of
automation
system
Reliability of

automation
system
Mistakes in
Programming
Instrument
light
Number of
monitors
Bridge space
Sense of
responsibility
noise
weather
condition

0

0

24

48

3

0

50

10

15

0

0

0

60

7

7

0

60

25

2

0

0

0

26

41

7

0

15

46

14

0

0

45

26

4

0

Source: Author
The scores of different important grades have been marked in the table. According to
the number of votes shown in the questionnaire, the total scores are calculated.
Table 4-Observe the importance of different factors through total scores
The first factors

Operator's own ability
(only L)

The second factors

Total scores

Workload

265

Lack of basic skills

213

Level of trust in the system

205

Recognition of automation
system

220

Fatigue and boredom from
normal work
Sense of responsibility

277

Situational awareness

316

Experience level

200

Tension level

217

Preparation before sailing

206

Coordination with
Relationship between
operator and other workers
(L-L)

successors
Crew cooperation
Communication with
trainers
Complexity of automation
system
Reliability of automation

Relationship between
operator and hardware
(L-H)

Relationship between
operator and environment
(L-E)

320

system

200
293
220

223

305

Mistakes in Programming

279

Number of monitors

243

Instrument light

190

Security on the Network

265

Noise

224

Weather condition

184

Bridge space

203

Inadequate navigation
supervision

Relationship between
operator and software

Training of shipping

(L-S)

company
Navigation information

250

164
150

Source: Author
Through the above data, the main human factors in MASS are responsibility
awareness, information overload, dependence on automation, loss of situational
awareness, fatigue and boredom from normal work, mistakes in programming,
communication between shore-based operators and other relevant organizations and
security on the network.
3.4 Main human factors identification of MASS
3.4.1 Responsibility awareness
Crew members should understand the responsibilities of all parties involved in an
operation. They should know the situation of this ship and other ships in time when
avoiding collision, because most sea areas in the future will be mixed traffic areas
with MASS and normal ships. SCC operators or a few crew members on MASS need
to know the responsibilities and consequences brought about by each operation.
(Wang&Sun, 2019) The most important provision in Convention on the International
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS) , for example, is the second
liability clause, which has two meanings: first, COLREGS does not exempt the ship,
master, owner or crew from liability for the consequences of "any negligence in
complying with the provisions of these Rules", "in accordance with the usual practice
of seafarers" or "any negligence in the exercise of caution required by the particular
circumstances of the case". Secondly, in complying with the collision avoidance rules,
"due regard shall be given to all hazards of navigation and collision" and "any special
circumstances, including the limitations of the ship's conditions", even if these

hazards and special circumstances would lead to a departure from certain provisions
of the collision avoidance rules (Wang, 2018) . This raises another fundamental
problem. For departure from the rules, from the point of view of a semi-automatic
ship, the shore-based operator must have extensive seagoing experience in order to
know what decisions to take in response to sea conditions. But few crew members
will encounter departure from the rule, so there is no guarantee that the shore-based
personnel will be able to make the correct decisions in the event of an emergency
deviation. For fully automated ships, instilling the meaning of COLREGS into the
system is very difficult. Currently, MASS engineers can develop collision avoidance
methods at sea using shipboard cameras and sonar to identify objects. (Wang, 2018)
But when to take an action contrary to COLREGS is difficult to achieve by procedure.
3.4.2 Information overload
As shown in Figure 3, shore-based operators often receive a very high volume of
information, as their normal workload is to monitor six vessels simultaneously, as
well as to obtain information about the vessels by constantly monitoring six gauges.
There are nine top marks on the top of the instrument and these are divided into three
colors, green to indicate that the vessel is operating normally and is not in danger of
collision, yellow to alert shore-based personnel that there may be a vessel in the
distance that needs to be avoided, or that there is some deviation from the values set
for the vessel at the beginning, and red to indicate a critical situation that should be
dealt with immediately. The circle next to the dashboard indicates a mode viewer, in
order to solve the problem of management control in the system. Even though every
effort has been made to solve the complexities of automation, it can still result in
information overload. It is easy for operators to forget or fail to recognize the relevant
information, so they cannot understand the sea conditions. At the same time, different
sensors are installed on different ships, and the information given by these sensors
may conflict with each other, which will lead to errors when shore-based personnel
switch operations from one ship to another. The impact of such errors is often very
serious (Yemao et al., 2015) . Secondly, the three-dimensional vision of the operation

center is used to replace the feeling of shaking on the ship, which is very stressful for
the crew (Porathe et al., 2014) .

Figure 3-The operator’s work station and one dashboard to display 9 group
information from one unmanned ship
Source: Yemao Man, Monica Lundh, Thomas Porathe, Scott MacKinnon (2015),
From desk to field - Human factor issues in remote monitoring and controlling of
autonomous unmanned vessels, ScienceDirect
3.4.3 Dependence on automation
Since the alert level of MASS should be at least the same as or even higher than that
of manned ships, in many cases shore-based personnel may excessively trust
operators in SCC, resulting in reduced monitoring efforts and accidents occurrence.
This is a well known situation, and most people who are exposed to automation on a
regular basis will develop new bad habits. In daily life, for example, a driver has a
new car and it is equipped with parking radar. For a while after the device is installed,
the driver still stops the car and looks in the rear-view mirror to see if there are any
rocks around. But as the number of stops increases, the driver realizes that his parking
radar will alert him even if there is an obstacle, so he gradually stop worrying about
wiping out his car. Moreover, it will make drivers stop more and more casually so as
to speed up the speed of parking. This kind of habit may lead to deterioration of safety
awareness and new dangerous situations in the end (Ahvenjärvi, 2016).
3.4.4 Loss of situational awareness
Shore-based personnel have no direct physical connection with the ship and cannot
directly know the environment around the ship. Electronic interfaces have replaced
the traditional human perception in the crew field. Even experienced captains may

lose situational awareness without visual perception of the surrounding environment.
Only counting on the data of the wave direction shown in the instruments is quite
dangerous. Remote steering without a sense of rocking in the boat is difficult even
under smooth sailing situation. From some of the research reports, it has emerged that
the two main elements in maintaining the "harmony" of a ship are the tacit
understanding of the seafarers and the "sense of ship" which cannot be lost
(Prison,2013) . "Harmony" means to maintain the ship to a dynamic balance through
the efforts of all aspects of the crew. If the sense of ship is lost, harmony will be lost.
The following two pictures describe the relationship between situational awareness
and elements in "harmony". The analysis proves three differences in the requirements
of situational awareness between ships and shore bases. The picture on the left is Fig.
4(a). The picture on the right is Fig. 4(b).

V：visual information

K：kinetic information

Figure 4-(a) tetrahedral model adapted from harmony; (b) four discrepancies are
identified for further analysis
Source: J. Prison, J. Dahlman, and M. Lundh, (2013) "Ship sense - striving for
harmony in ship manoeuvring," WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs
(1)All environmental data and equipment real-time parameters need to be collected by
sensors and then sent to SCC. Environmental factors are a prerequisite for the
formation of situational awareness. Previous technologies cannot solve the problem,
but the new technology has the function of data communication as much as possible.
(2)From the dynamic on-board environment to the static SCC control room, the
operator cannot feel the shaking of the ship, nor can he judge bow-trimmed or

stern-trimmed. Static environment has greatly affected the generation of situational
awareness.
(3)The operator can only obtain the situation on board the ship according to the
information of sensors. In SCC, monitoring becomes the main task. This part shows
that the main task is to analyze the task and make clear the appropriate operation
suggestions.
3.4.5 Fatigue and boredom from normal work
Under normal circumstances, the degree of fatigue will be directly affected according
to factors such as crew working time and workload. If extra working hours are too
long (maybe 3 to 4 hours), fatigue will grow very rapidly, and this growth is more
obvious when the workload and pressure increase. Since operators of SCC need to
pay attention to six ships at the same time, shore-based operators will have a series of
adverse effects once fatigue occurs. For example, negligence of lookout, unclear
thinking, misjudgment, inflexible and maladjusted movements, difficulty in bringing
good navigation skills into full play, and decline in the level of ship handling until
accidents such as ship collision occur due to insufficient response speed. In addition,
boredom can also be defined as a state of fatigue, produced by the constant repetition
of dull and tedious activities (Fan, 2020) .
3.4.6 Mistakes in Programming
Even if the ship is unmanned, every act of MASS and the computer program to
maintain the operation of the ship are attended by people. In software development,
some simple human accidents often occur, such as spelling mistakes in some similar
coding processes, which can be easily corrected. However, what is difficult to detect
is the algorithm of the computer when an abnormal situation occurs. The designed
algorithm leads to dangerous operations under special circumstances. S. Ahvenjärvi
analyzed such situations in 2009. After all, the software designer cannot tell the
operator whether he can safely drive the ship (Ahvenjärvi, 2016) .The expert group
writing the software cannot predict some accidents in advance.

3.4.7 Communication between shore-based operators and relevant organizations
Shore-based personnel need to have full and close communication with other ships,
VTS and other departments. In VTS supervision work, VTS attendants use VTS, AIS
and other equipment every day to closely monitor the ship dynamics in the waters
under their jurisdiction. At the same time, they listen to VHF channels and complete
the key work of directing and monitoring ships entering and leaving ports, entering
and leaving anchorages, passing through narrow waterways and bypassing dangerous
water areas. To ensure a good navigation environment and a stable security situation
in the jurisdiction area. If a ship operated by shore-based personnel finds that the ship
may sink in a short period of time or a large amount of oil spill pollutes the marine
environment, VTS personnel need to be contacted to deal with such emergencies.
VTS personnel need to fully understand the on-site information and think about it.
This is to adapt to the variability, complexity and uncertainty of the environment. In
reality, due to lack of emergency rescue experience and inaccurate role positioning in
emergency rescue, some VTS workers are panicked and slow in response to
dangerous situations, with disorganized emergency handling procedures, delaying the
best rescue time and affecting the rescue effect.
3.4.8 Security on the Network
Due to the anonymity and connectivity of the Internet, Internet security risks have
become a new maritime security problem. Anonymity gives users appropriate
protection so that they can freely express their ideas through the Internet, but it also
gives criminals cover (Wang&Sun, 2018) . Traditional pirates threaten shipping
companies by taking ships hostage. MASS ensure the safety of personnel, but the
insecure SCC network system provides convenience for hackers to attack MASS
computer systems. Hackers will threaten shipping companies by controlling MASS to
use the value of goods or MASS themselves as chips. The anonymity of the Internet
makes human factors in new piracy simpler and pirate attacks more covert. In addition,
the risk of the perpetrators being arrested at the time of the act is lower, and

connectivity enables Internet users to achieve global connectivity (Duan, 2019) .
Although there are computers on ships now, they are "closed systems" independent of
the Internet. The computers on ships have no connection with other computers on the
Internet. However, with the development of MASS, ship owners will rely more and
more on the Internet to issue orders to manipulate ships. The Internet has become an
invisible path for hackers to attack.

CHAPTER 4 HUMAN FACTORS OF AUTOMATION IN RELATED FIELDS
This chapter looks up various documents about different infrastructures evolving into
unmanned intelligent devices. These devices are more dependent on direct
decision-making on land than ships before becoming intelligent, so when they
develop into unmanned equipment, they need to face more severe challenges of
monitoring and remote command. This paper will consider various aspects, such as
safety, practicality, emergency handling, situational awareness and the impact on
society. Then an analyze on the impact of human factors on unmanned devices in
these areas and search for previous solutions to eliminate human factors will be given.
The comparison between these solutions to an unmanned vessel, and whether the
study would contribute to the human factors suggested chapter 3. Mutual research
between fields is the exchange of technologies and consideration of potential risks,
these include: unmanned cars, drones, space operations, military, metro, docks, and
cranes. Identify the challenges and possibilities of unmanned vessels through these
areas and analyze the human factor from both onboard and SCC perspectives.
4.1 Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
With the continuous progress of unmanned aerial vehicle system technology, the
accident rate of unmanned aerial vehicle system is also increasing year by year.
Investigation shows that more than 40% of accidents are caused by improper
operation or mistakes of operators (Waraich et al., 2013) . RQ-4 Global Hawk and

Predator UAV System is the primary provider of continuous intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance information. They can fly at high altitude for more than 30 hours.
Global Hawk is designed to collect large area near real-time and high-resolution
images under various weather conditions. In addition to intelligence gathering, part of
Predator is responsible for providing communications relay support for air and ground
users. In 2012, the crash rates of these two types of UAV are shown in the table
below:
Table 5-Global Hawk and predictor crash rate in 2012

Source: Internet
It can be seen from the table that human factors have a high accident rate even in
unmanned aerial vehicles. Therefore, it is very important to research the influence of
human factors on the operation of UAV system to improve the safety level of UAV
system and the operation level of operators. Generally speaking, eight positive aspects
can be learned from UAV system.
4.1.1 Teamwork in UAV
No task performed by a drone can be accomplished by a single operator, and its

success depends on a team effort. Some scholars based on a series of unmanned aerial
vehicle simulation tasks between one operator and two operators of the comparative
study have shown that an operator alone control unmanned aerial vehicle can not
effectively complete the task (Qi, 2015) . There needs to be an unmanned aerial
vehicle organization, which includes aircraft operators, commanders, intelligence
analysts, air traffic controllers and maintenance personnel. Each role in the group has
different responsibilities. In addition, in order to ensure the efficiency of task
operation, each member of the team must cooperate with the lowest conflict and
misunderstanding state under the same goal, which can reduce misunderstanding
caused in the process of information sharing and improve the efficiency of
information transmission and use.
In MASS, this mechanism of teamwork is also worth learning. MASS are divided into
semi-automatic and full-automatic. In semi-automatic MASS, ships need close
cooperation between ship personnel and shore-based personnel. Both need to establish
a more effective communication and authorization mechanism so that instruction
given by shore-based personnel can be executed immediately, and emergency event
can be better handled. For semi-automatic ships, the risk of coordination is much
smaller than that of fully automatic ships. In fully automated ships, most of the
shore-based personnel in SCC need to pay attention at all times. They not only need to
monitor multiple ships at the same time, but also need to give appropriate instructions.
This workload exceeds their load. Therefore, the control center needs to train other
types of personnel to reduce the burden of shore-based personnel. For example,
MASS can add cabin monitoring personnel and emergency treatment experts to their
original posts. The original operator is still responsible for understanding the
surrounding environment and preventing cabin monitoring personnel are responsible
for observing the status of different equipments in the cabin at all times. When an
emergency occurs, the emergency operator can take control from the normal operator
to check and control the failure, so as to help the damaged ship or deal with
unexpected emergencies, preventing damage to the hull or loss of cargo due to

incomplete command by the operator alone. At the same time, emergency handling
procedures and crisis handling plans shall be established, and group drills shall be
conducted to improve the ability of the operator group to deal with emergencies. Of
course, the group must also have perfect pre-simulation plans and analysis solutions,
so as to better improve navigation safety.
4.1.2 Reasonable Distribution of Human and Machine Functions
For UAV operators, the most effective interface and control system should allow for
an optimal balance between human resources and UAV mission requirements. The
best optimization in UAV is that the system enters a state between the two extreme
states of full manual and full automatic control. For example, power aided steering,
anti-skid braking and speed control help the operator to maintain auxiliary control,
while other functions such as engine cooling, fuel pressure, lighting and locking are
automatically completed (Alan Hobbs&Beth Lyall, 2015) .
The application of this aspect can also be tried on MASS. In the remote control state,
the MASS operator is mainly responsible for the realization of all system functions in
the navigation process, including navigation speed, collision avoidance and target
marking, etc, which need to be completed manually. In contrast, full automation of
system functions prohibits operators from performing any task operation. However, if
reasonable allocation can be achieved, the system can perform some low-order
operations, such as controlling navigation and obstacle avoidance. Advanced
operations are implemented by operators, such as target ship selection, termination of
tasks, emergency handling, etc. This arrangement frees the operator from the tedious
task of navigation and allows him to focus on mission execution and completion. If
during periods of specific risk, it is associated with system mode errors and
coordination failures. At this time, the MASS can automatically transfer the control to
the system. Of course, after the system is processed, the operator will smoothly
resume control of the ship.
4.1.3 The health of the crew will be improved

Many pilots will get sick due to various aviation medical problems, such as air
pressure injury, anoxia, spatial disorientation caused by vibration and acceleration, but
unmanned aerial vehicles have perfectly solved this problem and ensured the health of
pilots. MASS are similar. Seasickness has always been a problem for many crew
members. It increases the fatigue of the crew and increases the probability of
accidents. But this kind of difficult problem will appear on MASS.
In general, the adaptability of MASS to severe weather is very high, and it can
provide safety guarantee through professional team cooperation or reasonable work
distribution. However, some problems of UAV may also appear on the MASS.
4.1.4 Lack of design standards
Different designers will create different kinds of ground control stations, many of
which have little aviation experience or do not involve airlines in the design process.
This may lead to the design of ground control stations underdeveloped mission
requirements、rough edges of very new tech and divergence from aviation standards
(Qaisar R. Waraich et al., 2013) . All of these will bring unnecessary fatigue, tension
and even danger to pilots. For example, in response to an emergency, the pilot
mistakenly thinks that the unmanned flight system is in an emergency state, or the
emergency situation may not be displayed on the screen, causing the pilot not to
understand.
MASS also face this problem. Most MASS designers have no experience in ship
operation and do not understand the situation on board. They can only design step by
step according to the written knowledge. This will cause major problems in
emergency situations. For example, in the process of collision avoidance of multiple
ships, it is difficult for MASS to analyze the order of collision avoidance. Improper
actions will lead to failure of collision avoidance and damage to ships. Fortunately,
even if the design criteria are not perfect, the errors will not become more because of
the longer time in the system life cycle. And as the mistakes are corrected, the MASS
network system will become more perfect. Unlike hull or equipment, the system will

become old due to long time, and errors will increase with their aging.
4.1.5 Limitations to See & Avoid Capability
Due to video technology limitations (cost, bandwidth, size) remote pilots’ eye
receives less visual information than the airborne pilot's human eye. In this regard, the
difficulties faced by operators of UAV and MASS are almost the same.
– Limited in higher contrast settings (sunrise, sunset, sun/lights in camera FOV); Low
light environments.
– Bandwidth / framerate / latency / (cost)
– Video quality dependent on data link quality
– Resolution / Acuity ‐ as displayed in GCS/SCC
– Wide FOV vs human peripheral vision, & Zoomed FOV vs human focal vision;
Auto‐focus
4.1.6 Loss of situational awareness
Generally, situational awareness is described as the operator's cognition of the state
and change in machine operation. This recognition enables operators to respond
quickly and appropriately to unexpected events. An experimental study by Hussmann
shows that compared with the traditional driving mode, the automatic driving operator
takes longer reaction time. The problem that can be seen from this is that many
drivers perform improper operations on the mode of automation, which is called mode
error. Traditional pilots can use hearing, smell, vision and touch to get a lot of clues
which are beneficial to flight safety. It is difficult for the pilot to understand the flight
status of the UAV if these signals are not available. Therefore, compared with the
pilots of manned aircraft, the UAV ground station operators can be said to operate the
UAV in an " isolation" environment. A variety of accidents can prove that the causes
are rarely caused by one human error or a single event. They are actually all formed
by a series of minor errors.

Situational awareness is the ability to identify a fault chain and break it before the
accident. It can know what is going to happen related to the safety of ships and
equipment at any time and identify the fault in time. Likewise, T. Porathe realized that
there was no "ship sense" in SCC (Porathe, 2014) . On ordinary ships, the shaking
degree, smell, smoke, navigation instrument information, current and wave size of the
ship can all be the clues for the crew to find the "ship sense". The ship sense can help
them reduce the pressure. Only with enough situational awareness can take
corresponding actions in case of an accident, because the body's response is faster
than the instrument. The operators in SCC for autonomous ships may pay most
attention to the monitoring equipment, ignore the perception of the external
environment and at last lose the situational awareness. SCC needs to acquire more
data information and video images, and achieve a dynamic and continuous balance
state through reliable communication between the unmanned ship and the ground and
other MASS, which can make up for the lack of situational awareness as much as
possible (Yemao Man et al., 2015) .
4.1.7 Over dependence
Excessive dependence on automation in the unmanned area shows that people do not
doubt the safety of automation and do not fully check automation. When the operator
relies too much on automatic driving, on the one hand, he loses the instant
information of the system, and he will be distracted and judged, on the other hand, in
the long time, his handling skill will be reduced (Zhang, 2000) . Once an abnormal
situation occurs, it is difficult for the operator to identify it. Even if it is found,
jumping from automatic driving to manual driving to correct errors may take more
effort. Some studies have shown that under the condition of high load and after using
automatic control, the change of dynamic characteristics of the system is slower be
found by operators than under the condition of manual operation. If the manual
operation of the driver is still needed when the automatic control fails, it is necessary
to pay attention to the retraining of the manual operation of the operator. This will
maintain the necessary experience of manual operation. At this point, the airline

companies and shipping companies have been quite perfect in simulation training, but
some details should be improved.
4.1.8 Communication with various parties
In the field of UAV, GCS personnel need to communicate with all aspects of staff.
First of all, crew members should have clear responsibilities, and remember to cross
check (Harris D, 2009) . Fully understand each other with air traffic control personnel
to prevent single communication mode and misunderstanding of English terms.
Coordinating with the crew in advance is necessary to prevent someone to take over
when their physical condition is not suitable for duty. During the flight training,
communicating with the flight instructor and ask questions, so as to better understand
the automation system are required. Communicating the status of UAV with the
maintenance personnel directly or through flight notes, and informing the
maintenance personnel in time in case of any problem are highly recommended.
In the field of unmanned vessel, SCC not only needs to fully communicate with the
staff, but also faces the uncertainty of some human factors. As for the communication
with the staff of the port, different countries may have differences in language and
culture. And in the process of collision avoidance, the two ships communicate through
VHF, and they always have different opinions on the understanding of rules.
4.2 Unmanned crane
With the development of science and technology, many wharfs are faced with the
increase of labor cost, and personnel are often injured in the process of operation. So
many wharfs use intelligent crane technology to realize unmanned and automation.
There are many kinds of technologies involved in the specific process of intelligent
unmanned crane, among which the more important technology types are sensor
technology, communication technology, automation technology, etc. From the current
situation, the application of automation technology is the most common. ERP
information technology has also been popularized, and with the expansion of its

application scope, people have also strengthened the research on the technical content.
However, in this environment, unmanned cranes bring many uncertain factors to the
operator's work.
4.2.1 Too much load on operators due to diverse work
In the terminal, the main task of the remote operator is to load and unload the
container, and his activities are only aimed at controlling the crane to load and unload
the cargo, which takes a very short time. But in the traditional cabin, the staff need a
long process to put the goods safely. For example, each operation needs to carefully
position the goods, and then move the goods from the stack to the truck and then to
the container. The advantage of this operation is that the operator can not only keep a
high concentration all the time, but also have time to predict the next step in the whole
process (Karvonen et al., 2012) . Many similar jobs will receive temporary tasks. This
requires a very high level of remote operators, who need to respond quickly in a short
time. This task is not only different every time, but also giving the operator not
enough time to response in the remote cabin, which greatly increases the operator's
fatigue.
The same is true in the field of MASS. In traditional navigation, taking over, being on
duty and sailing are carried out in a long period of time. Even if there are additional
tasks, the captain will not be assigned to the current pilot. But the operators in SCC
are different. They need to monitor multiple ships all the time. Too many temporary
tasks will inevitably put a lot of pressure on the operator.
4.2.2 Lack of perspective
When working in the traditional crane cabin, the operator can use vision to observe
the situation of the terminal and the location of the surrounding containers, so as to
determine the best location reasonably. In the whole process of loading and unloading,
the most important thing is to know the location of each container. But if the
three-dimensional sense and perspective dimension are damaged in the remote control
cabin, they need to rely on limited video and pictures to restore the main view of the

container terminal, and they cannot use direct vision to observe the loading area (Sun
et al., 2016) . This is the limitation of video transmission. Operators need to learn new
methods to adapt to this mode.
In the field of MASS, visual deterioration will also cause trouble to the operators in
SCC. During the navigation, they may not have a more direct and detailed outlook
through video observation. Even if GPS and radar can give them part of the
surrounding information, it is very difficult to judge the timing of collision avoidance,
steering amplitude and other factors without using visual observation. With visual
observation, when berthing the ship, the pilot can not only get the prompt of the tug
crew on the ground, but also judge the berthing distance more accurately. Therefore,
operators in SCC need to adapt to and perceive the new operating environment.
4.3 Self-driving cars
Nowadays, the degree of automation of car driving is more and more high.
Technology helps cars to have the technologies of distress alarm, adaptive cruise,
collision avoidance, active lane keeping and so on. Although automated vehicles have
been studied for nearly half a century, they still face some challenges. Moreover, these
problems do not belong to "hard" problems in hardware and equipment, but belong to
"soft" problems aiming at the coordination, acceptability and practical operation of
human factors (Neale,. & Dingus, 1998) .
4.3.1 Adaptive automation
Automated cars can change the driving state according to driving conditions (such as
surrounding environment, traffic density, weather conditions) and driver conditions
(such as age, driving time, gender) . The system can filter out unnecessary
information according to urban planning, road conditions and other factors, and
provide more direct and effective information for drivers (Pavone, 2016) . In the
process of driving, choosing the right route can not only reduce the driver's pressure,
but also alleviate the traffic congestion. The automatic car can "anti monitor" the

driver, judge the safety level of driving according to the physical and mental state of
the driver, and remind the driver when he is sleepy and tired (Victor, 2000) .
These are also applicable to the field of navigation, the complexity of navigation
water areas is more complex than the road conditions of car driving. Therefore, it is
more necessary to add adaptive automation to the system. In the system, different
navigation modes can be selected by referring to the offshore distance, sea conditions
and weather conditions. At the same time, SCC should change the original warning
system, which is not suitable for all crew members. Over emphasized and non
emergency alarms are annoying; too early or wrong alarms can lead to distraction,
ignoring alarms or even shutting down the alarm system, resulting in the "wolf
coming" effect. Too late alarms may not prevent accidents. Abe and Richardson (2005)
points out that drivers believe in early collision warnings rather than late warnings.
From these conditions, it can be analyzed that the alarm system needs to judge the
alarm time according to the operator's experience. The inexperienced crew members
need to be reminded in advance, otherwise the accident will occur.
4.3.2 Anxiety
When unmanned technology is formed and applied to normal life, we ignore an
important factor, the negative impact of anxiety and the interaction of positive
evaluation and anxiety. In society, many people's attitude towards unmanned
technology is still to understand and fear to use (Christoph Hohenberger et al, 2017) .
The most important reason is that automation is not safe enough. Some people also
think that automated driving gives hackers the opportunity to control their cars
remotely, or even stop them at any time. In short, the higher the anxiety level, the
lower the willingness to use autopilot.
In the traditional maritime navigation, there are not a few crew members who refuse
the unmanned ship or intelligent ship. They think that the automation is not the
highest degree, but the automatic driving system of medium degree. It may be
particularly dangerous because people can not keep vigilance for a long time.

Venkatesh also proposed that people will have a huge psychological load whether
automation is reliable or not (Venkatesh&Bala, 2008) . When the automation is
reliable, the crew may show complacency and relax their vigilance; when the
automation is not reliable, the operator needs to solve the problems caused by
automation, which is difficult for the crew without enough professional knowledge.
This kind of anxiety brought into daily work will have an impact on the operation, and
the crew will be afraid to make mistakes that they cannot correct. The popularization
of MASS is only a matter of time, so how to solve the negative effects brought by this
anxiety? I think it's necessary to have enough professional knowledge reserve and
deal with emergency situations before working. Self height technical improvement is
more effective than any external help, because they are eager to show their ability to
protect others' safety, so as to overcome the influence of anxiety.
4.3.3 Behavioral adaptation
In the field of unmanned cars, people who often use intelligent driving will have
lower risk rate, higher work efficiency and more rest time than those who do not often
use intelligent driving. This is very relevant to proficiency. This phenomenon can be
explained by risk balance theory (Ward, 2000) . It can be understood that when the
perceived risk of drivers changes, drivers will adjust their behavior and restore their
preferred target risk level, in other words, they are more willing to be close to the
cyclist who wear helmet.
The same is true in the field of navigation, and the difference between unmanned ship
and unmanned driving is that the operator in SCC is not on the ship, while the driver
of unmanned car is on the car. This ensures the safety factor of operators, and their
anxiety and fear of danger will be greatly reduced. But at the same time, as this sense
of crisis decreases, they may be more prone to make mistakes when operating. For
example, when two ships are close to each other, most operators in SCC will follow
the route map given by the system, which is correct from the data of sensors and other
equipment, but causes risks in actual operation.

4.3.4 Learn more relevant knowledge
The operator should know enough automation knowledge before driving the
unmanned vehicle or the MASS, which is very important to deal with the special
situation of the equipment. In the field of rally, Wahlström invented a rally control
center for remote monitoring of the rally schedule. They found that in general rallies,
when accidents occur, it is the spectators who call to communicate with the center, but
the spectators can not accurately report the specific location of the accident, so most
of the competition schedule will be suspended or even forced to end. But if the control
center has an expert on rally cars and the local environment, he can predict where the
accident happened and help the ambulance get to the right place (Wahlström et al.,
2011) . For the field of unmanned cars, if people cannot enhance their understanding
of automation in the training, they can only add an expert in the field of automation in
SCC.
4.4 Unmanned subway
The application of unmanned metro in the field of global rail transit is gradually
favored by all countries. The unmanned metro in Paris, Singapore and other cities has
been officially put into operation. In addition, Marseille, Berlin and other cities are
transforming the original traditional metro into unmanned one. Like MASS,
unmanned subways are monitored by operators in the control room. Because there are
a large number of passengers in the subway, this situation needs to be compared with
intelligent merchant ships. The conclusions reached have the following effects on
intelligent merchant ships:
4.4.1 Recognition of Obstacles
Unmanned subways have their own functions of detecting roadblocks and route
planning. If dangerous barricades are detected, even the operator in the control room
is not required to control them, the subway will automatically give an alarm or even
stop (M. Wahlström et al., 2013) . But now the defect of the system is that it can only

detect the obstacle, but is impossible to distinguish whether to directly pass or stop the
obstacle, only to detect the obstacle or not. In this way, the small obstacles on the
track will make the unmanned subway generate false alarm.
This is also a challenge for MASS. The MASS system needs to have an accurate
comprehensive evaluation of the target. For animals in the sea, people in the water
and small fishing boats, the system should give the order to stay away. For floating
branches and some marine garbage, the obstacles can be ignored. If the MASS is
sailing in the ice area, the situation will be more complicated. This kind of decision is
very difficult for automation. SCC needs to evaluate whether the MASS needs an
icebreaker, which belongs to the task of SCC. This needs to be considered in the
design process.
4.4.2 Parking clearance
The first thing to note is that when the traditional subway stops at each station, the
driver can get a lot of information by observing the surrounding environment. They
can observe the abnormal part of the crowd, such as the drunk, the disabled, children
and other passengers who need special attention, or passengers who use trolleys,
brackets and other items. Since drivers encounter many similar situations at work
before, they quickly judge the situation by experience. The driver has enough time to
predict the needs or potential problems of these passengers. But how can an
unmanned subway do this? The second point is about the accident caused by
passengers. In the traditional subway, the opening and closing time is fixed. If the
passengers' body or goods are sandwiched in the door, the driver can open the subway
door again, so as to avoid the occurrence of danger. Some passengers may block the
door with their bodies in order to let their late friends get on the subway. Under
normal circumstances, they will be given a warning. But for unmanned subway, this
behavior is very dangerous (Karvonen et al., 2011) .
In the field of MASS, for the first point, when two ships meet, the MASS cannot
judge the intention of other ships, and cannot grasp many opportunities in the

collision avoidance rules. For example how to understand the time when the collision
cannot be avoided only by the action of giving way vessel, when to adopt the
departure rules, etc. The probability of accidents will be greatly increased. The
semi-automatic ship sometimes needs the crew to manage the loading and unloading,
but the time of the ship staying in the port is controlled by SCC. If there is a single
way of communication between the staff on board and the operators of SCC,
inadequate mutual understanding or misunderstanding in English terms, these may
cause property damage or accidents. For intelligent cruise ships that may appear in the
future, we should not only pay attention to the danger of improper boarding time, but
also consider how to pacify, evacuate and save ourselves in case of fire or terrorist
attack when there is no pilot on board. With the automation system, SCC can only
dispatch ships from the nearest wharf, which will waste a lot of time.
4.5 Militarization automation
In the military field, it is often a combination of a variety of automation facilities. For
example, MASS, drones, unmanned submarines, etc. These devices make
militarization easier and more accurate. At present, they have been put into
anti-terrorism operations. Compared with special forces and bombers, they can reduce
the number of casualties on our side. Drones and submarines can stay in enemy
territory for hours, which is hard to detect. However, in long-range operations, human
factors will still have an impact on the unmanned system.
4.5.1 Fatigue and boredom of remote operation
Traditional pilots are usually tired because of the disorder of biological clock, lack of
sleep and uncertainty of working time. The UAV operators are tired from operating
the UAV in Ground Control Station (GCS) . In 2008, the U.S. Air Force raised the
standard of UAV operation and extended the working hours every day. GCS became a
24-hour shift system control center. After Tvaryanas and Thompson's investigation of
GCS working environment, rest interval and working time limit, they also inquired
about the frequency of overtime work due to special circumstances and temporary

work. Investigators found that UAV crew members tend to be more fatigued than
traditional pilots. In addition, other workers in GCS, such as maintenance personnel
and emergency experts always feel tired. This is because most UAV missions will last
a long time, and the crew must adjust their biological clock for a long time.
In the field of MASS, the working and rest time of SCC staff are also very irregular,
they are facing day and night imbalance. Because there are always people who have
to choose night shift in the working mode of the whole day. For people on night shifts,
the quality of sleep during the day will be affected by temperature, noise and light.
Daytime sleep is usually 1-4 hours less than that at night. For a long time, this will
lead to their physical disorder, insomnia during daytime rest and sleepiness during the
working hours at night. This will inevitably lead to memory loss, slow
decision-making and inattention due to fatigue at work.
4.5.2 Distinguish friends and foes
The increasing number of UAVs in the war has led to legal and ethical disputes on the
use of UAVs. According to a survey conducted by Columbia University, the number
of people injured by drones accounted for 35% of the total victims in 2011.
Conor Friedersdorf once published in the monthly magazine that "unmanned
operation is an unprecedented assassination and will never end (Etzioni, 2013) . Keith
Shurtleff also said: "as war becomes safer and easier, soldiers gradually get rid of the
terror of war. They no longer regard enemies as human, but as light spots on the
screen. The deterrence brought by such terrorist acts is unimaginable. Although UAVs
can distinguish whether buildings are targets, they cannot identify enemies and
innocent civilians. Similarly, there is no way for MASS to distinguish between pirates,
victims and normal people. SCC should consider such issues in the design process.

CHAPTER 5 RISK COUNTERMEASURES OF HUMAN FACTORS IN MASS

5.1 Improve the operator's ability

5.1.1 Enhance operator's understanding of automation system
(1) In the initial training stage, the ship company should introduce the knowledge of
automation system, and this kind of knowledge learning should be throughout the
whole training process. During the training, the concept of automation system should
be defined and explained, which is helpful for the operator to transform the
automation theory into the actual operation of SCC. It takes time for the operator to
get to know and master the automation system. Therefore, the company should
arrange enough time in the training stage. In addition, in order to ensure that the
navigation skills, cognitive level and attitude of each operator can be basically kept at
the same level during the training process, the company should consider their learning
ability when recruiting operators, rather than focusing on the physical factors.
(2) Operators should spend more time learning navigation management system and
navigation control system before entering the actual simulation navigation. These two
systems are the core systems of many cockpit automation systems, so it is helpful for
the operator to grasp these two systems thoroughly, which will help the operator to
transition to the actual operation in the simulator more smoothly and quickly. In
addition, in the process of crew recruitment, the ability of the crew to master
technology should also be considered. They should not conflict with the disciplines
involved in automation in mentality. It is recommended that the shipping company
should select some students who are interested in relevant technical disciplines.
(3) During the training, the ship company should focus on the explanation of the
principle of automation system so that the operator thoroughly understand the
working principle of the automation system and fully understand the interdependence
between the systems. Especially in China, where English is not an official language, it
is necessary to ensure that operators fully understand the meaning of various symbols
and warnings, grasp the technology different from the traditional way of navigation,
and maximize the functions of the automation system. In addition, a large number of
case verification should be added to the training. So that operators can understand all

kinds of situations in the course of navigation. Moreover, the communication between
operators should be facilitated, so that they can better understand the automation
system.
(4) During the training, the ship company should pay attention to the characteristics of
each operator. Even the most some experienced crew members will have their own
special needs. Therefore, the trainers should pay attention to teaching students
according to their aptitude, increase the interaction with students, encourage students
to put forward their own problems, and focus on the training according to each
student's characteristics.
(5) The simulation report system should be established. When the crew is at the
primary level, they will be very nervous when using the automation system. The
establishment of the simulation report system can encourage the crew to say their own
problems, so that the trainer can better understand the level of the students and carry
out targeted training.
5.1.2 Maintain situational awareness
(1) Keep external perception of mass at all times. The operator keeps a sense of the
state of the unmanned vessel and keeps himself in the state. In order to understand the
dynamic information of the system at all times during the navigation, it is necessary to
monitor the MASS status and working status closely. In case of any complex situation,
the automatic operation should be shut down in time and changed to manual
operation.
(2) Strengthen the understanding of system information. In the process of navigation,
operators should not only be able to master the navigation status at all times, but also
be able to find problems in time. It is more important to understand the meaning of
the automated system, otherwise it will cause the same result that the problem is
found and the problem is not found during the operation(Zhao, 2006) .
(3) Strengthen operators' ability to predict risks. When there is a problem with MASS,

the operator can find and understand it in time, and predict the cause and severity of
the problem, and take effective measures. This requires the operator to simulate the
data changes of the ship under special circumstances in the simulation training.
(4) Under the condition of less workload and good weather, operators should be
encouraged to turn off the automation system and use manual operation instead, so as
to keep them alert all the time.
(5) Create a fault manual to describe various possible faults and effective
countermeasures. Ensure that information is available when the operator loses
situational awareness.
5.1.3 Appropriate attitude towards automation system
(1) Complacency is a common negative emotion in advanced automation operation.
The focus of the training is to ensure the operator's situational awareness and the habit
of using automatic equipment and original navigation equipment alternately. In the
process of training, the operation of traditional equipment should be properly added,
so as to ensure the basic navigation skills of operators. Through training, operators
can understand the basic principle of MASS. This will also increase the confidence of
operators in the automation system and generate complacency. Therefore, when
training, trainers should pay attention to establish their awareness of vigilance and
inform them of the serious consequences of automation system, which can relieve
their overconfidence in the system.
(2) The research shows that when the automation system breaks down, the operator
will hesitate. In this case, operators often choose to rely on the automation system
rather than listen to the advice of other SCC personnel. Therefore, operators must
understand the ability limit of automation system. SCC should make it clear that the
automation system only acts as an auxiliary tool and cannot completely replace the
operator. Operators should be clear about their own central position, not blindly rely
on automation.

(3) To establish a trust boundary, operators should know when to use automation and
when to perform manual operation. It is more important to know when to use
automation than how to use it.
5.2 Strengthen the cooperation between operators and other personnel
5.2.1 Strengthen cooperation among SCC personnel
(1) Define the responsibilities of SCC. In the process of navigation, operators are
easily influenced by conformity psychology, which causes psychological state error
and deviates from their own tasks. As members of SCC, they should always be clear
about their tasks and know what to do and what not to do (Wang, 2008). Under
special circumstances, if the operators in the same group lose their own ability,
another operator should be able to assume the responsibility of the incapacitated
driver. This mechanism should be more explicit when the operator conducts initial
training. It is necessary to fully mobilize their subjective initiative, respect the tasks
that both parties are responsible for during the voyage, and do not intervene
excessively.
(2) Implement and strengthen cross inspection. The cooperation and cross inspection
of SCC personnel are the most important elements to ensure the safety of navigation.
Operators must constantly monitor the automatic mode on each others’ display. If
there is any change of navigation mode, the operator must use the corresponding
navigation mode according to the instructions of the display. Any information change
on the MASS must be announced by the operator who actually operates the MASS
and confirmed by the operator who is responsible for monitoring. If the operator who
operates the MASS does not give a warning under special circumstances, the operator
responsible for monitoring must announce it and require the operator who operates the
MASS to confirm it.
5.2.2 Improve communication between operators and SCC managers
(1) Try to improve the operation procedures, and operators and administrators should

use standard terms carefully. Formulating practical rules of language to guide
operators and controllers in what way and language to correctly query and convey
instructions. Simulation training should be used to improve the level of both sides to
use normative language.
(2) Formulate corresponding standards, and stipulate that the operator and controller
shall have oral communication in different situations. Develop communication
equipment and classify the information level released by administrators so that
operators can better distinguish the severity level of tasks and make reasonable
judgments.
(3) In the operator training and administrator route training stage, they should enhance
their understanding of the basic operation principle of mutual automation system.
Ensure that the operator and the administrator can better understand each others’
intention in the process of communication.
5.3 Improve procedures
5.3.1 Improve training content
(1) Arrange training time reasonably. In the training, the factor that the operator needs
time to master the automation system should be fully considered. Therefore, the
company should arrange the training time reasonably, and arrange the learning
automation and understanding system in each stage of the training, so as to control the
automation system more conveniently. For example: simple and natural dialogue;
clear and easy information prompt; more intuitive monitoring system.
(2) Adjust the training content. The focus of training is on the understanding of
automation, rather than simple button operation. Training should be given to operators
on problems they encounter in an automated environment, increase the application of
computer simulation software, let the computer simulate all kinds of special situations,
and let everyone discuss and analyze, and get effective countermeasures
(3) Ensure enough training time and quality. In order to improve the company's

performance, some companies reduce the investment cost of operator training. The
training time and content shall be strictly followed after being formulated. Fully
consider the time needed for operators to learn and master the automation system to
ensure the effective implementation of the training plan.
(4) Due to the continuous development of automation system, the training program
should be adjusted, updated and improved at any time, and new instrument display
equipment, such as navigation system, should be used in the training. Ensure that the
training content is consistent with the actual operation.
5.3.2 Establish reasonable standard operation procedures(SOP)
While exploring and establishing the operation mode, enterprises should also pay
attention to the formulation of procedures. According to different ship types and the
actual situation of each ship company, the standard operation procedures should be
formulated. In addition, when formulating SOP, routine standard operation procedures
and operation procedures in various emergencies should be included. In this way,
operators can be guided by SOP in special and dangerous situations, helping them
make correct judgment and operation, reduce operation risk and improve safety level.
5.4 Improve the design of automation system
5.4.1 Follow the design principle of "human centered"
Following the design principle of "human centered", its goal is to have an impact on
the design of human-machine system in technology, so as to consider human
capabilities and limitations from the early design stage to the final design stage of the
system. In the design process of automation system, the purpose of design should
always be clear. Automation system is to enable operators to better understand the
system and operate more safely.
5.4.2 Improve navigation interface design
(1) Simplify the system interface. The purpose of automation design is to enable

operators to better understand the system and control automation system more
conveniently. For example: simple and natural dialogue; clear and easy information
prompt; more intuitive monitoring system.
(2) Add information prompts for important systems. While simplifying the interface
of the bridge, the intermediate computing process of the system should be added
information so that the operator can fully understand the operation of the automation
system. With reference to the results of calculation, the importance level and
suggested measures shall be given.
5.4.3 Introduce more advanced position and navigation system
At present, the ship anti-collision system of MASS only works when two search ships
are close. Ground radar system can monitor the position of MASS, but this kind of
monitoring makes MASS in a passive state. So it is necessary to introduce a new
positioning system. At present, global positioning system (GPS) is playing an
important role in many fields. But it is used as an auxiliary navigation in commercial
unmanned vessel. The disadvantage of GPS is that users can only know their own
position, but do not know the position of the other.
5.4.4 Increase system information feedback
The information feedback of the system to the crew operation not only provides the
SCC with the opportunity to correct, but also helps the SCC deepen the understanding
of the problem. In the process of information input, feedback, collection and
correction, SCC can effectively improve the ability of decision-making and judgment,
generate a virtuous cycle, and ensure the safety of navigation.
5.4.5 Consider individual operator habits
In the future, the control center will pay more attention to the "user experience". The
users here refer to the operators instead of the ordinary passengers. In the future, they
should pay attention to improving the ergonomics of SCC and the driving habits of
operators. The next control center may not look "cool" to the operator, but it must be

easier to use. Therefore, the future display technology of control center is not only
dedicated to adding new technologies and functions, but also should pay more
attention to the use habits, operation convenience and training time of operators, so as
to provide operators with more vivid situational cognition.
5.4.6 Enhance the design of non-automatic system
Due to the high complexity of automation system, perfect system can not be
developed. The designers of control center should consider the design of some
non-automatic systems in order to make up for the defect of automatic system. In
particular, improve the design of non-automation system that are related to
automation system. For example, the design of the seat in the control center. The
comfortable seat can make the operator find the feeling of "passenger", as if he is a
part of the MASS when controlling the system.
5.4.7 Enhance network protection system
Due to the connectivity of the network, MASS needs to accept the signal of SCC at
any time, which is no longer the closed network of traditional ships. Therefore, when
designing the system, the designer should consider the hacker's invasion in many
aspects, design the firewall system and add the function of regular and comprehensive
inspection to the system. Even considering the worst results, emergency procedures
are added to the system. When the MASS is invaded by hackers, the system will
automatically shut-down after sending messages to the authorities and SCC.
5.5 Strengthen company management
5.5.1 Strengthen company organization
(1) Strengthen resource management. The company must always guarantee the
investment in safety and training, and cannot reduce the necessary expenses in this
aspect even in the period of shortage of funds so as to ensure the advanced and
complete degree of training equipment and a good training environment.

(2) Enterprises should pay attention to the training quality of operators. In terms of
navigation and training time, they cannot be content with only reaching the minimum
standard. The training shall be carried out according to the actual situation of each
operator, and the corresponding regulations should be written into the training plan of
the enterprise (Zhao, 2008) .
(3) Establish reasonable reward and punishment policies, encourage operators to
improve their navigation level, and punish operators who violate regulations.
Strengthen the management of the relevant navigation manual to avoid the operator
losing the situational awareness due to the wrong information.
5.5.2 Establish a good safety culture
(1) Establish operator safety culture awareness. Strengthen the training of operators'
safety awareness, so that they always keep the idea of safety first in subconscious.
Remove the safety propaganda of slogan way, formulate and implement the
corresponding safety policy practically, add the thought of safety into SOP, and start
from ensuring safety when formulating the corresponding laws and regulations. When
making safety policy, it is necessary to focus on navigation related departments, and
provide organizational support and safety commitment for operators. Let them have a
sense of belonging to the company and put the company first.
(2) Voluntary reporting system. The company should attach importance to the accident
part of the voluntary reporting system. Do not just focus on punishing the operator. It
is necessary to investigate and analyze the problems reported by the operators,
propose effective countermeasures, and feed back the corresponding results to the
operators or write them into the relevant manuals. Those who admit mistakes
initiatively should be punished as little as possible and kept secret. This can improve
their enthusiasm and provide more information for the development of accident
prevention measures.
(3) The company needs to strengthen the supervision of the unsafe behaviors of
operators, be intolerant of the violations, and criticize and educate them. In addition,

the company should pay attention to whether there is a bad competitive relationship
between operators, which leads to a bad atmosphere in the company. The company's
own safety department should also be supervised to avoid the reduction of safety
management level caused by benefits.

CONCLUSION
The application of MASS in society will be more and more common. If we want to
give full play to the role of MASS, there are still many problems to be solved. This
paper focuses on reducing accidents caused by operator errors by focusing on human
factors related to MASS operators. Summing up the whole article, it can be found that
the operator working environment in SCC is diverse, and the operators need to play
different roles. Their responsibilities are not just basic navigation tasks. If they cannot
understand since their position correctly, it is difficult to take over and control the
automation system. In addition, for the intelligent control system, it is necessary to
emphasize that the traditional ship's pilot is an interface when communicating with
other ships, but the logic of the automatic system operation is not suitable for the crew.
When the system communicates with the crew, it is difficult for the crew to predict the
next action of the system. In order to be widely used in the future, it is hoped that
appropriate coordination can be carried out to satisfy both the shipowner and the crew.
In this paper, we predict some human errors that may occur in MASS through the
analogy with intelligent devices in different industries. The possible challenges of
MASS are identified. Some of these challenges are related to the environment (such
as the loss of situational awareness); some are related to the system hardware (such as
the allocation of human-computer tasks); some are related to people (such as
communication with SCC personnel). It is believed that that only when there is an
accident in the intelligent system in real life can there be greater progress in the
research of unmanned ships, but there are few real cases. The causes of such accidents
are difficult to predict, which is also the limitation of this article. We can only prepare
preventive measures and solutions from the environment, hardware, company and
training as much as possible.
The human factors of MASS can also be extended to other areas. The environment
that MASS faces is uncontrollable. When designing the system, the designer should
add any bad weather to the system at any time. If we regard the automation system as

a closed system and ignore the dynamic factors that suddenly appear, the security
problems will appear. For example, the UAV may encounter a storm or bird during
flight, so it is better to set emergency procedures for such emergencies.
In the future, the automation level of MASS will only be higher and higher, and the
actual skills of operators need to keep up with the development progress, so as not to
lose the control of the system.
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QUESTIONNAIRE
Shipping Company A Sampling Questionnaire Of Main Human Factors
In order to further study the influence of unmanned vessel on crew behavior, promote
the practical application of theoretical research results, and reduce accidents caused
by human factors, we conducted a sampling survey on the operators of a ship
company. The main purpose of this questionnaire is to determine the risk factors that
are likely to affect peoples unsafe behaviors. Please refer to the survey as a
representative of navigation practitioners. This investigation is anonymous and strictly
confidential.
1、Gender (Single choice questions)
○ Male
○ Female
2、Age (Single choice questions)
○ Under 30
○ 30-39 years old
○ 40-49 years old
○ Over 50yearsold
3、Degree of education (Single choice questions)
○ vacation
○ undergraduate
○ postgraduate
4、duties (Single choice questions)
○ captain
○ chief officer
○ the second officer
○ the third officer
5、The type of ship you are driving
________________________
6、sailing age (Single choice questions)

○ 1-2 years
○ 3-5years
○ 6-10years
○ more than 10 years
An investigation on the influencing factors of unmanned vessel on human behavior
7、The following table lists the human factors of the unmanned ship. Please choose
according to your own experience and understanding in the corresponding degree of
influence.

Workload
Education
level
Fatigue and
boredom
from normal
work
Lack
of
basic skills
Experience
level
Recognition
of
automation
system
Situational
awareness
Level
of
trust in the
system
Tension
level
Preparation
before
sailing
Crew
cooperation
Coordinatio
n
with
successors

Very
unimporta
nt（1 point）
○
○

unimportan intermediat important
Very
t（2points） e（3points） （4points） important
（5points）
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

Security on
the Network
Inadequate
navigation
supervision
Training of
shipping
company
Navigation
information
Complexity
of
automation
system
Reliability
of
automation
system
Mistakes in
Programmin
g
Instrument
light
Number of
monitors
Bridge
space
Bridge light
noise
weather
condition

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○
○
○

○
○
○

○
○
○

○
○
○

○
○
○

Suggestions for supplement and modification
8、What other influencing factors do you think should be added？
________________________
9、What are your comments on the above influencing factors？
________________________

